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Abstract
We present protocols for threshold cryptography in the GBD public-key cryptosystem.
Both threshold decryption and threshold key generation are covered, in the “honest-but-
curious” setting. This shows that it is possible to perform GBD computations in a distributed
manner during both key generation and decryption, without revealing the private key to
any party. GBD threshold decryption is similar to El-Gamal threshold decryption. GBD
threshold key generation is based on adaptations of protocols for RSA key generation by
Boneh and Franklin, and Catalano et al, and includes a new protocol for efficiently computing
the inverse of a shared secret modulo another shared secret.
We also show an application of GBD threshold cryptography to RSA key recovery. This
is based on the use of GBD as a master cryptosystem, whose use allows generation by
individual users of RSA moduli that can be factored by using the GBD private key as
trapdoor information. This application requires RSA key generation to be tailored, but
other operations are standard RSA. Clearly, compromise of the GBD private key would
compromise all corresponding RSA private keys, so the security of the GBD master private
key should be stronger than the security of the individual RSA keys, and this can be achieved
using threshold methods. Finally, we point out two open problems in the RSA key recovery
application.
1 Introduction
This paper applies techniques of threshold cryptography to the GBD public-key cryptosystem
of Gonza´lez et al [GBD01, GBD04]. We develop both GBD threshold decryption and GBD
threshold key generation, and we consider finally an application to key recovery for the RSA
cryptosystem.
Threshold cryptography [Gem97] shares the private key amongst a number, `, of players,
with a threshold, t ≤ `, such that any subset of t + 1 or more players can compute (decrypt
or sign) with the private key, but no subset of t or fewer players can do so (or indeed deduce
any information about either the plaintext or the private key). An example application is the
generation by an organisation of a digital signature for a contract, with the organisation’s signing
key being held not by one trusted individual, but as a number of shares held by members of
management, at least t+1 of whom need to take part in signing the contract. It has been widely
studied since [DF90] developed the first practical scheme.
These schemes offer protection against passive adversaries: the corruption of up to t players
does not compromise the security of the private key or allow an adversary to operate with the
private key, provided that the adversary is limited to viewing the state and communication
messages of the corrupted players. A subsequent development was the addition of robustness,
providing protection also against active adversaries that can alter the behaviour of corrupted
players in arbitrary ways. This is provided by requiring a player to prove that it has carried
out its computation correctly without compromising the confidentiality of its share, using a
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Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) scheme. See, for example, [Ped91] for ElGamal and [Sho00] for
RSA.
As described so far, threshold cryptography requires a trusted dealer to generate the keys,
compute the shares, and communicate these securely to all players. This is a disadvantage in
critical applications, leading to the development of schemes in which the players jointly generate
the shares of the private key without that private key ever being revealed to any party. This
was achieved by [Ped91] for ElGamal, but was more difficult for RSA, with the first practical
solution being produced by Boneh and Franklin [BF01], and a robust version by [FMY98].
In this paper, we apply the methods of threshold cryptography to the GBD cryptosystem.
The motivation for this work is two-fold. Firstly, we wish to show that applications using
GBD can benefit from threshold methods. Secondly, we demonstrate how, by using GBD as a
“master” cryptosystem whose security is enhanced by threshold cryptography, it is possible for
individuals in an organisation to generate RSA public and private keys that are then used in
standard fashion, but with the added capability of allowing the RSA private key to be recovered
by a sufficiently large subset of a group of designated key recovery entities.
The GBD threshold methods we develop in this paper are based in part on previous work
for RSA and ElGamal. GBD threshold decryption is similar to ElGamal threshold decryption.
GBD key generation is based partly on the work of [BF01] to generate a public value which is
the product of two secret primes, and partly on ideas from a protocol of Catalano et al [CGH00].
The ability to use GBD to provide RSA key recovery is based on the idea of “self-escrowed”
systems introduced by [PY99], in which the private key can be recovered by an authority using
the public key plus some trapdoor information available only to the authority. In the case of
GBD, the trapdoor information is the GBD master system’s private key, possession of which
allows factorisation of the RSA modulus n = pq provided that the primes p and q have been
chosen from subgroups generated by using the GBD public key. This application of GBD
was described in [GVBD02]. As described there, it depends on a highly-trusted key-recovery
authority (KRA) which holds the GBD master key; compromise of the KRA would compromise
all RSA private keys under the self-escrowed system. In the present work, we show that the KRA
can be implemented as a distributed system using threshold techniques, requiring an adversary
to corrupt t + 1 out of ` players in order to recover the master key. The values of t and ` may
be chosen to provide the desired degree of security and fault-tolerance. This is analogous to the
use of threshold cryptography to generate and control the use of the private key for a Certificate
Authority [FY98].
1.1 Communication and Security Model
For both threshold decryption and threshold key generation, we denote the number of players
by ` and the threshold by t. The protocols for key generation require t ≤ b(`− 1)/2c.
In common with other work in this area, we assume a private communication channel between
each pair of players, and an authenticated broadcast channel on which the sender of each message
is reliably identified1.
We restrict ourselves to the case of passive adversaries (often referred to as the “honest-
but-curious” model of security), in which players may collude to pool their information in an
attempt to discover secrets, but all players follow the protocol. Moreover, we use a static model,
in which the adversary chooses the set of players to corrupt before the computation begins.
Robustness could be added, if required, using the general algorithm described for example
in [Gol04] to produce a robust protocol from a protocol designed for the passive case; this adds
a commitment scheme, zero-knowledge proofs and Verifiable Secret Sharing to the protocol.
Alternatively, achieving robustness by using an approach specialised for this application would
1These may be implemented using standard cryptographic protocols for privacy and authentication.
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no doubt be much more efficient (as was the case for example with [GRJK00]), but this has not
been investigated further at this stage.
2 Summary of the GBD cryptosystem
Gonza´lez, Boyd and Dawson [GBD01, GBD04] presented a semantically secure public key cryp-
tosystem which operates in Z∗P , the multiplicative group of integers modulo a large prime P
such that P = 2N + 1, where N = Q0Q1 and Q0, Q1 are also prime. The security of the
cryptosystem is based on the difficulty of determining whether an element x ∈ Z∗P is a member
of the subgroup GQi of order Qi (for i = 0,1) given P and two elements g0, g1 of order Q0, Q1
respectively. The authors conjecture that the best attack against the GBD scheme is factoring
N , hence the primes need to be large enough such that factoring N is hard. In this way GBD
is similar to RSA since the key lengths need to be of similar size.
For the following description of the GBD constituent algorithms, we denote Gi as the proper
subgroup of Z∗P of order i. All operations are assumed to be reduced modulo P unless otherwise
instructed.
2.1 Key Generation G(1k)
This algorithm takes as input a security parameter k, and outputs a public key and corresponding
private key. The key generation proceeds as follows:
1. Generate the modulus P such that P = 2N + 1, where N = Q0Q1 and Q0, Q1
are each random primes of binary size k.
2. Select elements g0, g1 of order Q0, Q1 respectively.
3. Compute αi ≡ Q1−i(Q−11−i mod Qi).
4. Output the public key pk = (P, g0, g1) and the secret key sk = (α0, α1).
2.2 Encryption E(pk,m)
This algorithm takes as input a message m an element of the subgroup GN , and a public key
pk = (P, g0, g1).
1. Choose two integers r0, r1 uniformly at random in ZN .
2. Compute vi = grii , an element of GQi for i = 0, 1.
3. Compute ci = mv1−i for i = 0, 1.
4. Output the ciphertext c = (c0, c1).
Figure 1 illustrates the encryption algorithm. In the diagram the coordinate axes represent
subgroup components GQ0 and GQ1 . The plane represents GN . Any element m ∈ GN has
unique projections m0 in GQ0 and m1 in GQ1 such that m = m0m1. Since vi ∈ GQi , it follows
that the projection of ci in GQi is mi.
It can be shown that the unique projection of any element y of GN on GQi is given by
yi = yαi ,
which allows us to decrypt an encrypted message, as shown below.
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Figure 1: Encryption of m ∈ Gn.
2.3 Decryption D(sk, c)
1. Compute mi = cαii for i = 0, 1.
2. Calculate m = m0m1.
3. Output m.
It can be seen that encryption takes two modular exponentiations and two modular multipli-
cations, and decryption consists computing the product of two exponentiations. This decryption
can actually be implemented using algorithms that are far more efficient than performing the
two exponentiations separately. Brown et al. [BDG04] examine the implementation of the GBD
cryptosystem, and show that the efficiency is comparable to that of a semantically secure ElGa-
mal implementation for equal key lengths.
In fact, the decryption algorithm can be simplified in such a way that it requires only one
exponentiation and a division instead of two exponentiations. Let us now describe this modified
decryption.
2.4 Decryption D′(sk, c)
1. Compute u = c0/c1
2. Calculate m = c1 ∗ uα0 .
This decryption is correct since u = gr11 g
−r0
0 and raising this element of GN to α0 projects it
onto the subgroup GQ0 , giving g
−r0
0 . Hence,
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c1u
α0 = mgr00 .(g
r1
1 g
−r0
0 )
α0
= mgr00 .g
−r0
0
= m
Note that only α0 needs to be used for decryption and hence α1 does not need to be included
in the secret key. If it does need to be used at some later stage, it can be calculated easily since
α0 + α1 ≡ 1 mod N .
3 Related work in threshold cryptosystems
Here we discuss previous work done in threshold cryptosystems, with particular attention to
the work that directly relates to the threshold GBD protocols detailed in later sections. The
relevant threshold cryptosystems are ElGamal and RSA, with a focus on threshold decryption
and distributed key generation. For the remainder of the paper, we denote a t-out-of-` threshold
scheme as one where (t+1) is the minimum number of players, from a set of `, required to reveal
the shared secret or compute the desired operation.
Desmedt and Frankel [DF90] proposed a non-robust threshold ElGamal decryption scheme
based on Shamir’s secret sharing [Sha79]. In ElGamal, a ciphertext tuple C = (gk,mgak) is
decrypted by raising gk to the secret exponent a and finding the inverse to multiply by mgak
to reveal the message m, where g is a generator of a finite field, Fq of prime order q. Hence, a
t-out-of-` threshold ElGamal system requires the private exponent a to be shared amongst the
` players such that any subset T of (t+ 1), and no less than (t+ 1), players can collaborate to
compute the decryption.
This ElGamal threshold decryption scheme shares the private exponent a amongst the `
players by choosing a polynomial f(x) of degree t in a field such that f(0) = a. Each player Ps
is given the secret share Ks = f(s). Decryption of a ciphertext is done by reconstructing the
secret a implicitly in the exponent from (t+1) secret shares using Lagrange interpolation. This
means that the secret a is never actually explicitly reconstructed and remains secret. Without
loss of generality, let us suppose players 1 to t+1 are the subset T wanting to decrypt a message.
Each player in T can calculate firstly,
as = Ks
∏
r∈T,r 6=s
(0− xr)
(xs − xr) (1)
and then
g′s = (g
k)−as .
If these g′s values are then sent to some combiner, or alternatively broadcast to other players,
the message can be computed by the combiner, or each player in the latter case by:
mgak
t+1∏
s=1
g′s = mg
akgk(−a1−a2−...−at+1)
= mgakg−ak
= m.
This scheme assumes there is a trusted dealer to compute and distribute the public key and
private key shares. Pedersen [Ped91] built upon this threshold system by adding two major
improvements. Firstly, Pedersen provides a means for each participant in the protocol to verify
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that his secret share is correct. Secondly, Pedersen describes how to distributively generate the
public key and the private key shares, eliminating the need for a trusted party for selecting and
distributing the keys. Hence each participant’s share is known only by himself and the private
key is never reconstituted in one place during either key generation or decryption.
De Santis et al. [DSDFY94] presented a RSA threshold scheme for decryption and signatures
based, like [DF90], on Lagrange interpolation performed implicitly in the exponent. The prob-
lems of interpolating over Zφ(n), where n is the RSA modulus and φ(n) is the secret Euler totient
function of n, are avoided by instead working in the field Zφ(n)[X]/Φq[X], where Φ(n) is the qth
cyclotomic polynomial (taken mod φ(n)), and q is a prime. Although this allows for standard
sharing techniques to be applied directly, the resulting schemes are much more complicated than
using a polynomial interpolation over Zφ(n). The resulting schemes require either interaction or
large share sizes.
Rabin [Rab98] presented a different approach to threshold RSA which aimed to avoid the
complexity of the De Santis scheme. His approach combines two pre-existing solutions: (`-
out-of-`) additive sharing and (t-out-of-`) threshold sharing. The private exponent is shared
amongst the ` players using additive sharing, and each additive share is further shared using a
threshold scheme so that if a player is absent, its share can be recovered by t+ 1 players using
this back-up scheme.
Shoup [Sho00] presented a RSA threshold signature scheme that is proven to be unforgeable
and robust in the random oracle model. Also, Shoup’s scheme consists of completely non-
interactive signature share generation and verification, and the size of an individual signature
share is bounded by a constant times the size of the RSA modulus.
Boneh and Franklin [BF97][BF01] presented protocols for distributive RSA key generation
by allowing a number of parties to jointly generate an RSA key. Their contributions include a
protocol to generate the modulus n = pq which results in each party Ps holding shares ps and
qs such that p =
∑`
s ps and q =
∑`
s qs. They compute n using a simplified version of the BGW
protocol [BGW88] and provide a bi-primality test for checking whether n is in fact the product
of two primes. Algesheimer et al. [ACS02] later presented a protocol for generating a random,
shared prime, or safe prime, giving rise to a protocol for jointly generating an RSA modulus
that is the product of safe primes. Boneh and Franklin also describe an inversion protocol
for computing shares of the private exponent d = e−1 mod φ(n) given the public exponent e.
Catalano et al. [CGH00] later presented an alternative distributed inversion protocol for this
computation that is more efficient, with the drawback of large share sizes.
Frankel, MacKenzie and Yung [FMY98] built upon the Boneh-Franklin solution and de-
scribed a way of adding robustness to their protocols, and in particular the inversion protocol.
4 GBD Threshold Decryption
The task of distributively decrypting a GBD ciphertext is very similar to that of ElGamal. As
we have seen in section 2, GBD decryption requires a division of the ciphertext components and
one exponentiation using the private key exponent α0.
We achieve threshold GBD decryption using a polynomial sharing of the secret α0. Given a
ciphertext c = (c0, c1), a subset T of t + 1 players can collaboratively compute the decryption
as follows: each player Ps first computes u = c0/c1, then computes as in a similar way as
in (1), where this time the Ks values are α0,s, the polynomial shares of α0, and finally computes
u′s = uas and sends this value to each of the other players, or a combining party. Again let us
assume that the subset T consists of players 1 to t+ 1. The decryption can then be performed
as
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c1 ×
t∏
s∈T
u′s = c1.u
a1+a2+...+at+1
= c1.uα0
= m.
Note the decryption protocol as described means that each player needs to know the identities
of the other players taking part in the decryption, as its Lagrange coefficient depends on these.
An alternative approach would be for each player to compute us = uα0,s , and for one (or more)
players to multiply these to form the decryption after exponentiating each with the appropriate
Lagrange coefficient. Such an approach would suit a situation where it is not possible to predict
beforehand which set of decryption shares are going to be used — for example if it is necessary
to cope with computer and network failures.
Here, we have shown that a polynomial sharing of the private exponent α0 provides a t-out-
of-` GBD threshold decryption scheme. In terms of a security analysis of this scheme, since
there is a direct relation between our scheme and the Desmedt and Frankel threshold ElGamal
decryption scheme, the same security arguments hold for both schemes. To summarise, assuming
that the discrete logarithm problem is hard, it can be shown that no extra information about
the secret shares as can be gained by knowing the u′s values. Desmedt and Frankel [DF90] use
the simulatability concept of zero-knowledge proofs to show this.
4.1 GBD Threshold Projection
It is now useful, for our application to key recovery to be detailed in section 6, to discuss the
more general operation of GBD threshold projection. As we have stated in section 2, any element
y ∈ GN can be uniquely projected onto the subgroup elements y0 ∈ GQ0 and y1 ∈ GQ1 such
that y = y0y1. To compute these projections, the following computations should be performed:
y0 = yα0 mod P
y1 = y/y0 mod P
To perform this projection when α0 is shared polynomially as described above, each player can
compute yas and make this value known to the other players in the subset T . The calculation of
y0 can then be performed simply by computing the product of these yas values. The calculation
of y1 can then be performed by each player.
5 GBD Threshold Key Generation
It has long been recognised that the value of threshold decryption is lessened if it depends on
a trusted dealer to generate the initial keys and securely distribute the private key shares. A
trusted dealer is a single point of vulnerability which knows all the secrets, negating to some
degree the value of sharing the private key and using it in a shared fashion. For this reason, there
has been a focus on developing schemes which allow the process of generating key shares itself to
be carried out in a shared fashion, so that the private key and other secrets of the scheme never
exist as complete entities, only as secret shares. This is of particular interest for applications
where compromise of the private key would have major consequences, such as generation of the
private key for a Certificate Authority [FY98] .
Our motivating example, RSA key recovery based on the use of GBD as a master cryp-
tosystem, is a further example of this. Exposure to an adversary of any one of the GBD secret
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parameters Q0, Q1 or α0 would enable the adversary to perform the trapdoor factorisation of
all RSA moduli in the system and hence deduce all the RSA private keys. We therefore turn
our attention to methods of threshold key generation for GBD.
The GBD threshold key generation described here is based on the work of Boneh and
Franklin [BF01] for shared generation of the modulus N = Q0Q1, plus a new protocol to invert
a shared value modulo a shared value, based on Catalano et al [CGH00].
5.1 Building Blocks for Computations on Shared Values
5.1.1 Introduction
In this section we outline the basic protocols on which our shared-value computations are built.
In all cases, the input consists of zero, one or two values shared in polynomial fashion, and the
output is a single value shared in polynomial fashion. That is, each input and output consists
of shares which are values of some polynomial F (xs) for s = 1, . . . , `, where ` is the number of
players, F (x) is a polynomial of degree t, and F (0) is the shared value. F (0) could of course be
determined by Lagrange interpolation from any subset of t + 1 shares, but the purpose of the
protocols is to carry out the computation without revealing any shared value. A common choice
for the xs is xs = s, however, unless stated otherwise below, the protocols apply to any choice
of distinct values for xs.
An important result by Canetti [Can00] proves that a protocol for computations on shared
values can be based on the use of lower-level protocols as building blocks — he calls this mod-
ular composition. The resulting protocol is secure if the composed operations themselves are
secure and the composed operations are used non-concurrently, ie only one is in execution at
any one time. Each of the protocols below can be proved secure in Canetti’s model (see for ex-
ample [ACS02]), and the way we compose them in this solution satisfies Canetti’s requirement,
which is that only a single protocol invocation be in execution at any one time.
5.1.2 Shared Addition
From [BGW88]. This operation requires no interaction; to form the shares of polynomial
C(x) = A(x) +B(x), each player sets C(xs) = A(xs) +B(xs).
5.1.3 Sharing a Value
In many protocols, each player needs to share a private value Vs amongst all players. To do so,
it generates a polynomial Vs(x) =
∑t
i=0 vs,ix
i, with coefficient vs,i = Vs for i = 0 and chosen
randomly for i = 1, . . . , `. It then sends share Vs(xu) to player Pu, for u = 1, . . . , `.
5.1.4 Revealing a Shared Value
From [BGW88]. To reveal a shared value to one nominated player, at least t + 1 players send
their shares to that player, who determines the value by Lagrange interpolation. To reveal a
shared value to all players, at least t+ 1 players broadcast their shares, and all players perform
the interpolation.
5.1.5 Shared Random Number Generation
From [BB89]. Each player Ps chooses a random value Rs and shares it using the method of
5.1.3. The players then perform a shared addition (5.1.2) to produce the shared value R =
∑
Rs.
Only the final shares R(xs) are retained.
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5.1.6 Share Conversion
Algesheimer et al [ACS02] describe conversions in both directions between additive and polyno-
mial sharings of a value, and also between sharings over the integers and over a finite field. We
require a conversion from additive sharing over the integers to polynomial sharing in ZM , for
someM larger than the value A being shared. This is a straightforward combination of methods
from [ACS02]. To reshare the value A, held as additive integer shares As, requires two steps:
1. Each player Ps computes As modM and shares this polynomially using the method of
5.1.3.
2. Each player Pu, having received ` values As(xu), computes its polynomial share of A as
A(xu) =
∑`
s=1As(xu) modM .
5.1.7 Shared Multiplication
From [GRR98] and [BBM01]. Given values A and B, shared by polynomials A(x) and B(x),
this protocol produces a polynomial C(x) of the same degree, t, which is a sharing of the
value C = AB. Although the polynomial A(x)B(x) has the required constant term AB, it is
of degree 2t, and moreover its coefficients are not randomly distributed [BGW88]. Gennaro’s
method [GRR98] solves both problems together:
1. Each player Ps shares the value Cs = A(xs)B(xs) using the method of 5.1.3. The result is
that each player Pu receives a set of shares Cs(xu) for s = 1, . . . , `.
2. Player Pu then computes its share of C(x) as C(xu) =
∑`
s=1 λsCs(xu).
Here, the values λs are non-zero constants, being the first row of the matrix inverse of the
` by ` Vandermonde matrix M = (ms,u), where ms,u = xus . These values clearly depend only
on the choice of the xs. In particular, for the choice xs = s, the values are easily-computed
integers [BBM01]:
λs =
(−1)s−1`!
(`− s)!s!
5.2 Shared Generation of the GBD Modulus
Boneh and Franklin, in a landmark paper [BF01], present protocols for the shared generation
of shared RSA keys, consisting of two parts: firstly the generation of an RSA modulus n = pq
where p and q are shared primes, and secondly the generation of the private exponent in shared
form. For GBD, we adapt the first part to generate the GBD modulus N = Q0Q1, adding a
test that P = 2N +1 is prime. The second part is specific to RSA; our equivalent for GBD, the
generation of the GBD private key, is described in 5.3.
The shared generation of the GBD modulus obtained by adapting [BF01] is summarised in
Figure 2. Details of the shared computation steps 1b, 2 and 5 may be found in [BF01]. That
paper also contains proofs of the security of each step of the protocol. Since the only change
we have made to the protocol is the addition of step 3, which operates on a public value, these
proofs apply also to our protocol.
The successful completion of this protocol results in an additive sharing over the integers of
Q0 and Q1, ie player Ps has shares Qi,s such that Qi =
∑`
s=1Qi,s. All players also know the
value of N = Q0Q1 and thence P = 2N + 1.
The reliance on a biprimality test leads to a larger number of iterations than would be the
case for testing each Qi for primality in isolation. [BF01] quotes an expected number of iter-
ations of 484 to generate a 1024-bit RSA modulus, versus 44 for normal modulus generation
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Input: security parameter k.
1. The following steps are performed for Q0 first and then repeated for Q1:
(a) Each player Ps chooses a secret k-bit integer Qi,s. The value
∑
sQi,s is a
shared candidate for Qi.
(b) The players perform a shared trial division of Qi by small primes less than
some bound B1. If a factor is found, repeat from step 1a.
2. The players perform a shared computation to reveal the value of N = Q0Q1.
3. One of the players performs a primality test on P = 2N+1 as a local computation.
If this fails, repeat from step 1.
4. One or more players perform further trial divisions on N for small primes in the
range [B1, B2] for some bound B2. If a factor is found, repeat from step 1.
5. The players perform a shared computation to test that N is the product of two
primes; if this fails, repeat from step 1.
Figure 2: Shared Generation of the GBD Modulus
(both assuming trial divisions up to B1 = 8103 in step 1b). A subsequent implementation paper
for RSA [MWB99] describes further optimisations, including a technique of distributed sieving
and implementation optimisations based on concurrency. The paper cites total generation times
around 1.5 minutes for a 1024-bit modulus on a local network for three players (` = 3), and 5.6
minutes for ` = 5, using 333 MHz Pentium II systems running Solaris 2.5.1, a 10 MB Ethernet
network, and SSL to protect the privacy of communications. These times are completely domi-
nated by modulus generation; the contribution of the subsequent private key generation step is
insignificant.
A worst-case estimate for shared GBD modulus generation is obtained by multiplying these
times by the expected number of iterations required to find a prime P , about 350 iterations
for P of size 1024 bits, potentially giving a GBD modulus generation time of many hours. In
practice, it should be considerably smaller, since non-prime P values are eliminated at step
3, before the lengthy biprimality test. Further optimisations are also possible — for example,
instead of discarding the two Qi candidates if step 3 fails, generating one new candidate and
testing the primality of P for all pairs of Qi candidates found so far, like the approach taken
by [BDG04]. Even so, GBD threshold key generation using this protocol may be suitable only
for applications where it is required infrequently — for example the generation of the keys for
the GBD master cryptosystem in the RSA key recovery example.
Note also that [ACS02] presents a shared primality test as a possibly more efficient re-
placement for the biprimality test of [BF01], but we are not aware of any implementations or
experimental results.
5.3 GBD Private Key Calculation
The GBD private key consists of the projection exponent α0, and is computed from the primes
Qi as α0 = Q1(Q−11 mod Q0). For GBD threshold key generation, the input values Qi are shared
between the players, and we require that the output value α0 is also shared, to enable GBD
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threshold decryption and projection. Shares of α0 may be kept modulo N = Q0Q1, since they
will be used to exponentiate values y ∈ GN , which satisfy yN ≡ 1 (mod P ). We also require
that, in the “honest-but-curious” security model, the shared computation reveals no information
to an adversary that it could not obtain from the public key alone.
The secure computation of the private key will be performed as a shared inversion operation
followed by a shared multiplication. The multiplication is an application of 5.1.7. We describe
the inversion below. Note that the computations require that Q0 and Q1 be shared polynomially
in ZN : this is achieved using the method of 5.1.6.
The inspiration for our inversion protocol is that of Catalano et al [CGH00] which was
developed for the case where the value to be inverted is known and the modulus shared, and in
which computations are done in the integers. We extend the protocol for our case, in which both
values are shared, and specialise it for this application by performing computations modulo N .
The ability to run this protocol modulo N has attractive consequences: the shares of α0 have a
smaller size, and the security proof is straightforward2.
Our protocol is based on the shared computation of two random linear combinations of Q0
and Q1 modulo N :
F = (RQ0 + SQ1) mod N
E = (TQ0 + UQ1) mod N
where R, S, T and U are independent shared random values in ZN . The values of F and E are
then revealed to all players, and each player performs a local computation, using the extended
GCD algorithm to compute integers a, b and d satisfying aF + bE = d. Substituting for F and
E, we obtain:
(aR+ bT )Q0 + (aS + bU)Q1 ≡ d (mod N)
e(aR+ bT )Q0 + e(aS + bU)Q1 ≡ 1 (mod N) where e ≡ d−1 (mod N)
e(aS + bU)Q1 ≡ 1 (mod Q0) since Q0 is a divisor of N
that is, e(aS + bU) ≡ Q−11 (mod Q0) which is the desired result.
Each player Ps therefore computes its share of C, the inverse of Q1, from its shares of S and
U as Cs = e(aSs + bUs) mod N . The probability that the inverse d−1 mod N does not exist is
O(2−k), which is negligible for realistic values of N . The complete protocol is given in Figure 3.
Theorem 1 The protocol of Figure 3 securely evaluates the value of Q−11 mod Q0.
Proof The correctness of the evaluation follows immediately from the description above. For
privacy, we need to show that the protocol reveals no information about Q0, Q1 or the result
C. Note firstly that the polynomial sharing of Q0 and Q1 is obtained using techniques that are
known to be secure [ACS02] under the assumptions of Canetti’s model. The same applies to the
sharing of the intermediate values R, S, T and U . That is, an adversary gains no information
about any of these values by obtaining the shares of up to t players.
We now show that publishing Fs and Es for a specific s reveals no information about the
shares Q0,s and Q1,s. It can be seen that, for fixed Q0,s and Q1,s, and varying Rs and Ss,
Fs = (RsQ0,s + SsQ1,s) mod N ranges over all values in ZN except when Q0,s, Q1,s and N all
have a common factor. Since N = Q0Q1, this occurs with negligible probability. Moreover, Fs is
uniformly distributed over ZN , being a linear combination in ZN of independent random variates
which are uniformly distributed over ZN . This shows that Fs reveals no information about Q0,s
2An extension of the protocol for the general case where computations must be done in the integers is also
feasible, but not required for this application.
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1. Polynomially share a random value R ∈ ZN , resulting in shares Rs (5.1.5).
2. Similarly share random values S, T , and U ∈ ZN , resulting in shares Ss, Ts and
Us.
3. Each player broadcasts the value Fs = (RsQ0,s + SsQ1,s) mod N . These values
are shares of a random polynomial F (x) of degree 2t which has F (0) = F =
(RQ0 + SQ1) mod N .
4. Each player broadcasts the value Es = (TsQ0,s + UsQ1,s) mod N . These values
are shares of a random polynomial E(x) of degree 2t which has E(0) = E =
(TQ0 + UQ1) mod N .
5. Each player uses Lagrange interpolation (requiring 2t+1 shares) to compute the
values F and E.
6. Each player performs the extended GCD protocol to find a and b such that
aF + bE = d, and computes e ≡ d−1 (mod N).
7. Each player Ps computes its share of C = Q−11 mod Q0 as Cs = e(aSs+bUs) mod
N .
An efficient implementation would combine into one round the separate communication
rounds implied in steps 1 to 2, and also the rounds in steps 3 to 4. This protocol
therefore requires two rounds of communication.
Figure 3: Shared Inversion Protocol
and Q1,s. A similar argument applies to Es. Also, because Rs, Ss, Ts and Us are independent
random variates, Fs and Es are also independent of one another, and no information is revealed
by publishing them together.
In addition we need to show that publishing shares Fs and Es for all s ∈ [1, `] reveals no
information about Q0 or Q1. Since the only information that is directly computable from these
shares is the values of F and E, we do this by showing that the values of F and E do not
reveal any information about Q0 or Q1. The argument is similar to that for Fs. The value of
F = (RQ0 + SQ1) mod N ranges over all values in ZN , except when Q0, Q1 and N all have a
common factor (meaning that Q0 = Q1) which has negligible probability. Now we can write
F ≡ RQ0 (mod Q1) and (2)
F ≡ SQ1 (mod Q0) (3)
There are Q0 different R-values in ZN that satisfy equation 2 for a specific value of F , since
they are separated by multiples of Q1. Similarly, Q1 different S-values satisfy equation 3. So
there are N = Q0Q1 distinct linear combinations producing a specific value of F . That is, F
ranges over all values in ZN , and there are N pairs (R,S) producing each value F . Since there is
a total of N2 pairs (R,S), all equally probable, we see that each value for F is equally probable,
ie F is uniformly distributed over ZN . By the same argument, so is E. It is clear therefore that
publishing F and E reveals no information other than F and E themselves.
Finally, the individual shares Cs themselves which result from the protocol are also uniformly
distributed over ZN , being a linear combination of two uniformly-distributed random values Ss
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and Us. Therefore they satisfy the requirements of polynomial sharing, and any subset of t or
fewer shares reveals no information about the inverse C.
5.4 Computing the GBD Public Key
The public key consists of (P, g0, g1) where g0 and g1 are randomly-chosen elements of the
GBD subgroups GQ0 and GQ1 . These may be computed most straightforwardly by choosing
a random g in subgroup GN , projecting g onto GQ0 using g0 = g
α0 mod P , and computing
g1 = g · g−10 mod P . g is most easily obtained by having one player, P1 say, choose a random h
in [2, P − 2], computing g = h2 mod P and broadcasting its value. Computing g0 and g1 is an
application of GBD threshold projection (section 4.1) using the shares α0,s of the private key as
computed above.
6 Self-escrowed RSA
The notion of self-escrowed public keys is due to Paillier and Yung [PY99]. A public key
encryption scheme S = 〈G, E ,D〉 is said to be (perfectly) self-escrowed when there exists a master
encryption scheme S ′ = 〈G′, E ′,D′〉 and a master key pair (e′, d′) of S ′ such that all key pairs
of S satisfy e = E ′(e′, d). In other words, a public key is self-escrowed if the public key is itself
an encryption of the private key under some master cryptosystem. In the typical application
of self-escrowed cryptosystems, a trusted authority known as the key recovery authority (KRA)
owns the master key pair. System users employ S and generate their key pairs according to G.
Normally, these keys are then certified by a certification authority (CA). If for whatever reason
a private key needs to be restored, e.g. a user loses her private key, the KRA can do so given the
corresponding public key. The main advantage of using self-escrowed keys when compared with
other proposals (e.g. [YY98, Mic93]) is that the only information that needs to be stored by the
KRA is the master key. When the key recovery capability is to be enforced during certification
of public keys, it may be required that users prove to the CA that the public keys submitted for
certification are indeed self-escrowed, i.e. that they are valid keys from the range of G.
In a self-escrowed public key infrastructure the compromise of the master key is likely to
be catastrophic. The secrecy of all users’ private keys relies on the secrecy of the master key.
Furthermore, users must trust that the KRA will not misuse its key recovery capability. Because
of this, it is desirable to distribute the key recovery function among a threshold of authorities.
Paillier and Yung [PY99] described a self-escrowed discrete log based cryptosystem (a varia-
tion of ElGamal’s cryptosystem over groups of composite order). The master encryption scheme
is a deterministic version of Paillier’s encryption scheme [Pai99], for which threshold decryption
schemes are known [FPS01, DJ01]. In [GVBD02] Gonzalez et al . observed that the trap-door
function upon which the GBD is built can be used as a trap-door to the prime factorisation of
composite numbers of a certain form. This allows the generation of self-escrowed factorisation-
based public keys (e.g. RSA keys). Now the master encryption is a deterministic version of
GBD, for which there was no threshold decryption equivalent until now.
In what follows we apply the threshold GBD key generation and decryption of Sections 4
and 5 to the self-escrowed scheme of Gonza´lez et al . [GVBD02] for integer factorisation based
cryptosystems. For simplicity we focus on self-escrowed RSA, noting that self-escrowed versions
of other factorisation-based cryptosystems can be devised similarly.
6.1 Master cryptosystem
The master cryptosystem is shown in Figure 4 and assumes ` KRAs with a threshold of t. The
key generation algorithm outputs a description of subgroups GQ0 and GQ1 of Z∗P as the public
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key, where prime P is of the form P = 2N + 1, with N = Q0Q1, where Q0, Q1 are primes of
binary length k jointly generated by the KRAs as described in Sect. 5.2. The private key is
α0 = Q1(Q−10 mod Q0), which is generated and shared in a t-out-of-` fashion among the KRAs
as described in Sect. 5.3. Recall that α0 permits taking the projections of elements of GN onto
GQ0 . E ′ is a deterministic version of the GBD encryption algorithm. It is easy to see that its
one-wayness is still based on the projection problem assumption. The message space consists
of elements of GQ0 × GQ1 . Given a ciphertext c′, decryption requires the computation of c′α0
mod P , which can be performed jointly by any t KRAs as shown in Sect. 4.1.
Key Generation G′:
Input: security parameter k
Output: public key e′ = (P, g0, g1), private-key shares
α0,1, . . . , α0,` of α0.
Encryption E ′:
Input: message (m′0,m′1) ∈ GQ0×GQ1 , public key e′ = (P, g0, g1).
Output: ciphertext c′ = m′0m′1.
Decryption D′:
Input: ciphertext c′, any subset of t+ 1 private-key shares from
α0,1, . . . , α0,`.
Output: message (m′0,m′1) = (c′α0 mod P, c′/m′0 mod P ).
Figure 4: Master Cryptosystem
6.2 User’s cryptosystem
Figure 5 shows the cryptosystem S employed by users. The only difference with respect to
plain RSA [RSA78] is that now the key generation algorithm has been modified to output the
prime factors p and q lying in GQ0 and GQ1 . Since for large P the density of prime numbers
in the subgroups GQ0 , GQ1 can be considered the same as in the whole group Z∗P , the prime
number theorem (see e.g. [Rie94]) ensures that the amount of primes (p, q) ∈ GQ0 × GQ1 is
large, and that therefore they can be found efficiently. The RSA moduli generated by G are
ciphertexts of S ′ and therefore can be decrypted into its factors by any subset of t + 1 KRAs.
The key generation algorithm G can be extended to produce a non-interactive publicly-verifiable
zero-knowledge proof that n is the product of two primes belonging to GQ0 and GQ1 as shown
in [GVBD02]. Such proof might be required by a CA as a condition of certifying the public key
of a user.
6.3 Security of self-escrowed RSA
As noted in [GVBD02], the self-escrowed RSA cryptosystem described above has an important
shortcoming that reduces its usefulness. The effective security of RSA moduli n generated by G
is not greater than the security of the integer N generated by G′, while the typical length of n is
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Key Generation G:
Input: master public key e′ = (P, g0, g1)
1. Choose random r0, r1 in Z(P−1)/2 such that p = g0r0 mod P
and q = g1r1 mod P are both distinct primes.
2. Compute n = pq in Z.
3. Choose a ∈ Zφ(n).
4. Compute d = a−1 mod φ(n).
Output: user’s public key e = (a, n), user’s private key d.
Encryption E:
Input: A message m, public key e = (a, n)
Output: ciphertext c = ma mod n.
Decryption D:
Input: ciphertext c, user’s private key d.
Output: plaintext m = cd mod n.
Figure 5: User’s Cryptosystem.
double that of N . Note that the factors p and q of n are chosen randomly from the subgroups
GQ0 and GQ1 , and hence their typical length will be approximately |P |. It is an open question
whether it is possible to modify G to efficiently generate factors of significantly shorter lengths.
We note that this “key-doubling problem” is a consequence of the fact that the GBD modulus
P is known both to RSA clients wishing to generate an RSA key-pair and to the key-generation
servers: any participant can attempt on its own to recover the private key of all self-escrowed
RSA public keys by factoring P . If P were kept secret, then an attacker would have to fall back
on standard factoring algorithms, so the bit size of the RSA modulus size could be reduced to
normal levels — e.g. 1024 — and the bit-size of P to half that — e.g. 512.
To achieve this, the following modifications to the above algorithms would be needed, which
we leave as future work:
• The algorithm for the generation of the GBD modulus would need to be changed so that
N is not revealed to any single server.
• Since P would be a value shared by the servers, the inversion algorithm in Section 5.3
would need to be extended to the case where computations are done over the integers;
which appears doable in a way similar to the inversion protocol of Catalano et al . [CGH00].
• The key-generation algorithm of the self-escrowed RSA cryptosystem of Figure 5 would
need to be distributed, since the factors must be chosen from GQ0 and GQ1 , with the
modulus P now being a shared value.
A simpler approach would be to keep P secret only from the RSA clients, not from the key-
generation servers, meaning it would be necessary to distribute only the RSA key-generation
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algorithm. This would apply in a situation where it was deemed an acceptable risk for P to
be known to each server but kept secret otherwise. For example, a client could choose ri and
obtain grii mod P from shares of g
ri
i mod P (over the integers) sent by servers. If the client did
not trust the servers to compute the right value corresponding to ri, the servers would have to
provide proofs of correctness. A further simplification would be to allow the servers to generate
client keys, since clients already trust (a threshold of) servers with the confidentiality of their
keys.
Finally, we note that even when the master public key is never exposed, a concern remains
as to the security of RSA keys generated by G due to the sparsity of the distribution of primes
from which the factors are chosen. Only a small fraction O( 1√
P
) of primes in ZP is eligible to
be chosen. It is an open problem to devise a factoring algorithm that takes advantage of the
special form of these factors.
7 Conclusion and Further Work
Application to GBD of the techniques of threshold cryptography has been shown to be feasible,
thus extending the applicability of GBD to those contexts where it is required to secure the
private key information by sharing it between several servers. The threshold key generation
protocol may require running times in the order of hours, which would restrict the circumstances
in which it is practical. Experimental estimates of the time taken to generate the GBD modulus,
and possible improvements in the protocol to reduce this time, are potential areas for future
study, as is the development of an efficient robust version of the protocols.
We have demonstrated an application of GBD, and GBD threshold cryptography, to the
problem of RSA key recovery by using a self-escrow method. This suffers from the drawback
that it requires the RSA key to be double the normal length in order to maintain equivalent
security. We are investigating ways to overcome this drawback. In addition there is an open
problem of whether a factoring algorithm can be devised to take advantage of the special form
of RSA modulus generated by this self-escrow method; clearly this would affect the practical
utility of this approach to key recovery.
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